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Remembering Camelot:
Recent Adventures in Economy, Law and Politics
John Henry Schlegel*
Early in the first act of the Learner and Lowe musical, Camelot, the young
Arthur woos Guenevere, his intended bride, by describing the glories of his kingdom.
He concludes his argument: “In short, there’s simply not / A more congenial spot /
For happy-ever-aftering / Than here in Camelot.” For a while it was clear that
Americans lived in such a congenial spot. A large part of what made for happy-everaftering was its economy – a persistent market structure that fuses an understanding
of economic life that seems appropriate to the place and time with the patterns of
behavior within the economic, political, and social institutions that enact that
understanding. In memory, this congenial spot is called, not Camelot, though a part
of it, the Kennedy Administration, was called such, but rather the Post-War
Economy. However, in time the economy in this remembered congenial spot became
increasingly fallow. Exactly when this happened is not particularly important; it
happened in different places in different times. Eventually, it became clear that the
Post-War Economy was over, that the once congenial spot was now quite
uncongenial. It was time to rebuild, if not Camelot, at least an equally congenial spot.
What follows is an attempt to tell the story of the coming apart of the PostWar Economy and the search for a new economy (not The New Economy) over the
past 70 years. Because I am an historian of things American, I will focus on the
American story, told from a particularly Northern, Rust Belt perspective, though from
time to time I may advert to the broader story of the economies of the North
* Professor of Law, State University of New York Law School. Guyora, Barry, Matt, Dan, Jim,
Michael, Laura, Fred, Stewart, Dan, Stephen, John, Pierre and Jim helped by taking this piece
seriously.
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Atlantic. However, the point of the adventure that I am inviting you, my gentle
reader, on is not to get this quite long story right. As a matter of history such an
objective is impossible. 1 Rather, it is to try to understand the way that the humans
who lived in that congenial spot reacted to its demise. Their reaction has framed later
attempts to create a persistent market structure that might replace the Post-War
Economy. And so this memory of Camelot continues to inform judgments of the
appropriateness of any possible set of economic relations that America might stumble
into and thus helps to explain an important aspect of the economic politics of these,
our times.
The common cautionary remark, be careful what you wish for, you just might
get it, seldom constrains wishing. What America wished for in the aftermath of
World War II was a broader and deeper middle class. And that is exactly what it got.
How this wish was fulfilled is a relatively simple story, like many stories, a
combination of accident and only dimly perceived intent. The accident was the
results of that war which pretty much left the United States the last man standing in
the graveyard as the economies of both Europe and Asia were in ruin and the other
potentially vibrant economies – Argentina, Canada and South Africa – relative
dwarves. The intent was legal structure of the economy that was produced during the
New Deal, a structure that might be called Associationalist.
The theory behind that structure, to the extent that there was one, quite
unproblematically assumed that the centerpiece of the American economy was
manufacturing, especially mass manufacturing of consumer goods. It then suggested
that a strong economy could be built on the basis of high, fixed prices for such goods,
prices sufficient to cover manufacturers’ costs comfortably. Such prices could be
maintained by a combination of lax enforcement of the anti-trust laws at the
1. I would love to read a version of this story told from either a Southern or Western perspective.
Unfortunately I am limited to the perspective I have.
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manufacturing level, resale price maintenance agreements at the retailer level, and
support of consumer demand with stable, perhaps high, wages, plus programs to
provide unemployment and social security benefits. Associationalism implied a norm
of “fair” competition that was to be maintained in crucial areas of the economy –
particularly transportation, communications and finance – through federal regulation
and in politically sensitive agriculture through both price support and regulation.
Everywhere else, associations of industry participants would police themselves to
ensure fair practice and expose “chiselers.”
Much of the legal part of this structure can be identified by the acronyms for
the administrative agencies created (or resuscitated) by the New Deal Congresses to
administer regulatory programs – CAB, FCC, FAA, FDIC, FHA, FPC, FTC, ICC,
NLRB, SEC, USMC – and by the names of famous statutes – the various Agricultural
Adjustment Acts and Banking Acts, the Glass-Steagall Act, the Robinson-Patman Act,
the Social Security Act – less directly tied to administrative agencies.

The

effectiveness of such programs was not tested during the years they were enacted or
during World War II. In the former years consumer demand was too low to test
them; in the latter, the price of most everything was regulated and consumer goods,
when available at all, sparse. However, the prosperity experienced during the twentyfive years after the end of that war seemed to validate Associationalist economic
theory.
The generation of returning GIs experienced an economy growing so fast as to
quiet memories of the Depression years in which they had grown up. Housing grew,
manufacturing grew, vacations grew, colleges grew. Whole suburbs appeared, as did
televisions, stereos, interstate highways, surprisingly inexpensive very big cars, and
much bigger planes. The children of these men and women grew too, in great
numbers, a Baby-Boom generation with no memory of anything other than economic
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abundance. Though mocked in retrospect, for the pre-existing white middle class
these years really seemed to be captured by the Nelsons and the Chevers of TV fame.
Socio-economically another change was very important. This was the great,
two-part expansion of the middle class. First came a tremendous growth in whitecollar jobs that accompanied the increasingly bureaucratized world of middle
management in the large American corporation.

Exactly why management

bureaucratized in this way has never been clear. Perhaps it was a residue of life in the
armed forces or of wartime production methods where documenting exactly what was
done on each government contract was essential for payment. Perhaps it was just an
example of the occasionally hazarded iron law of bureaucratic expansion.

But

whatever the reason, these were the years when, if some new task needed to be done,
the American corporation hired someone to do it, rather than assigning it to an
existing employee.
Only a half step behind was a second, more significant change. This was the
great expansion downward of the middle class that created what might be called an
hourly, as distinguished from a salaried, middle class. This broader social formation
encompassed, not just the skilled tradesmen who long felt themselves to be middle
class, but also the vast armies of unionized, semi-skilled workers on the production
line. It was this new portion of the middle class that quickly moved into the small
cape cods and ranches that sprouted like weeds in the new housing developments that
defined suburban neighborhoods. These working class families choose to escape the
older doubles and triples in ethnic neighborhoods (often seen as “changing,” to use
the euphemism of the times) that traditionally were the lot of such working class
families.
It is important to understand that this complex of social and economic changes
was experienced by the returning GIs, their Baby-Boom children and, to a lesser
extent, their grandchildren as a set of settled expectations of what it meant to be an
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American. This was a sharply different set of expectations from those that might
have seemed appropriate in the first half of the twentieth-century. Ours was God’s
Country. We had won The War and this transformation in American life was our
proper reward.
Now it is impossible to know how much the sense of both euphoria and
contentment that characterized middle class life in the Post-War Economy was made
possible by the persistent market structure of these years. At the very least, the
ordered set of economic relationships established by the New Deal legislation
combined with Associationalist ideals to provide an implicit framework that made a
focus on social life easier. Beyond that observation, however, I shall not venture, for
there was a great unplanned for, unexpected circumstance that only, in retrospect, can
be seen to have made the Post-War Economy possible. An American economy of
high wages and high prices was easy to create because, for a good number of these
post-war years, that economy faced no international economic competition. There
were no other significant economies in the world.
Both Europe and Asia were prostrate. Beggars first, they needed handouts.
Later, they were just as self-absorbed as were Americans during these years, though
not on the project of enjoying an economy, but on that of re-building one. However,
by the mid-1960s Western Europe and Japan had gained sufficient strength to begin
exporting to the United States.

Their exported products generally underpriced

comparable American goods, both because American wages were higher and because
foreign production processes were often based on newer technology. In due course
such exported products were not only cheaper, but also often newly designed and of
better quality than the American products they competed with.
For the following thirty years, the response of most American manufacturing
firms to foreign competition consisted of a somewhat stereotypical set of moves.
Disparage the foreign product, start a “Buy American” program, yell “unfair
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competition” based on comparative wage rates, seek trade sanctions and, whether or
not successful in securing such sanctions, either slowly cede the market in the lowest
priced goods to foreign competitors or establish foreign subsidiaries and try to
compete domestically by importing a foreign sourced, but domestically branded,
product. Often either strategy was accompanied with complaints about “regulation”
– usually labor relations, wage and hour, occupational safety and environmental – and
“taxes” – primarily federal, though occasionally state and local.
Curiously, three possible responses to increased foreign competition did not
occur. First, neither labor nor management moved beyond their traditional zero-sum
bargaining positions toward the recognition of problems that required a joint solution.
Second, no one, other than soon to be idled longshoremen, complained about the
rapid decrease in the cost of ocean freight as containerization reduced the in-port
labor costs of breaking bulk, the risk of theft both in transit and in port, and the cost
of both rail and truck transit from port to destination.

Third, only rarely did

manufacturers move to make the capital investments that would have brought
competitive, much less advanced, production processes to the shop floor.2
The combination of these actions and absences accompanied the slow decline
in American manufacturing capacity, particularly in the consumer goods sectors that
formed the core of the Associationalist economy, though also in such producer
products such as cold-rolled steel. Understanding this decline is complicated by the
Great Inflation which itself is pretty difficult to understand.

2. Matt Dimick has raised he important question of why such investments were not made in earlier,
more flush times. I offered him a glib answer that, on reflection, does not hold up, since some firms
did and some did not. My current hunch is that a sufficient answer would focus on both the history
of American labor-management relations and that of the social impact of immigration. Fred
Konefsky agrees with the former hunch, but is much more dubious of the latter. He suggests that
the adoption of “30 and out” retirement plans in the steel industry in the early 1960s, and of
subsidized early retirement in the automobile industry somewhat later, provides evidence that
management in these industries knew what was going to happen as a result of its choice not to make
capital investments.
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From some time in the mid-1960s, best associated with Lyndon Johnson’s
adoption of a “guns and butter” policy for funding domestic and defense (read
“Vietnam War”) spending, until the very early 1980s, when the Federal Reserve Board
under the chairmanship of Paul Volker slammed on the monetary breaks, the United
States experienced an astonishing bout of inflation, cumulatively estimated at 200%.
Economists still haven’t settled their arguments about the causes of this inflation, and
curiously their ideas do not seem to take sufficient account of first the embargo of oil,
and then its great increase in the cost, that was OPEC’s response to the American
support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War. I have no interest in unraveling the
relevant causal claims.
In any case, Americans experienced these years as somehow unhinged. For
example, the usual benefit of inflation is that one’s imports become more expensive
and so fewer, even if one’s exports do not become cheaper. However, during the
Great Inflation such a benefit to the economy was absent since, for all practical
purposes, this bout of inflation was world wide, and in fact more severe in such
countries as England, France and Italy. Similarly, recessions only briefly tamed the
continuous surge in prices, as neither legally enforceable or voluntary price control
mechanisms had more than a temporary impact on prices.
One of the odd things that emerged from the sense that things were unhinged
was the notion that at least “a,” if not “the,” problem with the American economy
was one of over-regulation and so that “deregulation” was at least “a” cure for the
ailment. The fact that the sector of the Post-War Economy that was and remained
most troubled – manufacturing – was comparatively the least highly regulated seemed
to bother no one. In contrast, of the main targets of deregulation, state public
utilities, were not troubled at all.

Nor was state or federal banking.

telecommunications. Airlines, truckers or railroads, only extremely peripherally.

Or
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Still, deregulation was bruited about as the answer to economic sluggishness.
Costs could be reduced, old services improved and new services brought forth by
removing regulation and so loosing competition across the land. The results were
limited. State public utilities saw little reduction of cost, other than a shift away from
debt financing of capital improvement, at best an improvement to utility company
balance sheets; consumers experienced no clear improvement in service. The same
was mostly true of cable television, though eventually, the range of available product
increased wildly, even if service was still nothing special. Telephone was probably a
winner in cost reduction and expansion of product, but again debt financing was
abandoned, limiting the benefit to consumers. Transportation costs were probably
reduced, but at the unrecognized cost to those communities where service abandoned.
Even in communities where service was maintained, quality slowly deteriorated.
Banking is an entirely separate story that unfolded later, as part of the Great
Moderation that followed the taming of the Great Inflation.
Just what was the Great Moderation? A book by Robert J. Samuleson brought
this term to my attention, though he credited unnamed economists for having coined
it.3 Samuelson asserted that it described the steady growth in the American economy
that was the natural result of the ending of the Great Inflation, which he argued was
caused by the hubris of academic economists of the Keynesian stripe in believing that
the business cycle could be tamed through governmental action. I find this assertion
dubious, even though Keynes himself emphasized the importance of the ideas of
“defunct economists” for the course of economic and political events. However, for
now I wish to put off my alternative explanation of these events until I have finished
my story.
Still, it is true that in the early years of the Great Moderation inflation dropped
precipitously and then leveled off at about 4% until the early 1990s when it declined
3. The Great Inflation and Its Aftermath (2008).
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again to around 2%. While gains in productivity were unsteady, those in inflationadjusted GDP were steadily generous.

However, the decline of inflation was

accompanied with a rise in the value of the dollar that made imports cheaper. Not
surprisingly, the American demand for foreign imports increased and that for
domestic exports decreased. The resulting trade deficits meant a continuation of the
regular increase in the quantity of dollars sloshing around worldwide.
This great slosh of dollars had begun with the Marshall Plan in Europe and its
unnamed cognate in equally war-ravaged Japan. Growth in exports in both Europe
and Asia supported jobs there and so made these governments supportive of trade
liberalization (“freer,” never “free,” trade), long an American priority, that
Washington supported with the claim that the integration of economies though trade
relationships would provide both a bulwark against communism and a deterrent to
war among trading partners.

Freer trade, denominated largely in dollars, made

possible the ever-wider network that facilitated the trade in the products of
manufacturing and of agriculture that came to be known by the much conjured with
buzzword “globalization.”
Domestically, a similar great sloshing noise could be heard. It came from the
combination of the dollar denominated earnings of foreign manufacturers and traders
that they chose to invest in the United States, rather than exchange, and so repatriate,
and of the rapidly accumulating funds set aside for, and by, the Baby-Boomers in
contemplation of their eventual retirement. The most visible sign of the existence of
this slosh was news of hostile takeovers, often of conglomerates from the 1960s,
using borrowed money (hence also called leveraged buyouts). The design of these
takeovers was to sell-off enough corporate assets to pay off the debt used to fund the
purchase, to close down whatever was of little value, whether at the plant level or the
company/division level, and then to spruce up the remaining pieces for sale, either
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though a public offering or private sale. The firms that specialized in this business
were essentially economic scavengers. Some were very good at it.
Scavenging was a big business in these years as the manufacturing economy
continued its downward slide. The automotive industry was not a target, but it was
part of the slide.

Increased auto imports earned increased profits for foreign

manufacturers and increased worker hostility toward foreign cars. So, while the
domestic automakers were moving work to lower cost sites abroad, foreign
automakers were using their profits to build plants in the United States, particularly in
the union-hostile Sunbelt states. They thus maintained their quality advantage over
the cars of domestic producers while they eliminated much of their transportation
costs, as well as reduced, when unable to eliminate, tariff expense.
The continuing decline of this “flagship” industry caused great anxiety in the
land and brought forth a torrent of discussion of how America was going to compete
in the increasingly “globalized” economy without manufacturing – by which was
meant mass manufacturing of consumer goods.

The first (and in some sense

continuing) idea was financial services, though exactly what was meant by financial
services is more than a little obscure.
In the 1950s banking was highly segmented. There were commercial banks,
savings banks, savings and loans, investment banks and brokerage firms. The latter
two were sometimes found under the same corporate roof, but never with the first
three, which never were found together at all. The Glass-Steagall Act policed the line
between the first three and the final two. A mixture of state and federal law policed
the lines between the first three. These three types of banks could accept savings
deposits, which carried federal deposit insurance, but only the first could offer
checking accounts. Checking accounts were non-interest-bearing; savings accounts
were interest bearing and rates on such were regulated in such a way that allowed
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savings institutions to pay a slightly higher rate of interest than did similar accounts at
commercial banks.
As their name implies commercial banks primarily made money from
commercial lending and so their principal assets were commercial loans.

Most

borrowers were corporations or very wealthy individuals, most often associated with
their corporate customers. The other two bank-like institutions made money from
residential mortgage lending and so their principal assets were residential mortgages.
However, despite the difference in their markets, all three made money in the same
way. They borrowed short (from depositors) and lent long (to borrowers). The
difference between the interest paid to depositors and that paid by borrowers funded
bank operations and was the source of bank profits. For these institutions income
from fees was limited at best. In contrast, investment banks and brokerage firms
(then exclusively partnerships) made money from fees earned by the provision of
merger and acquisition advice, as well as investment banking, underwriting and
brokerage services and, in addition, from “investments” of various kinds made by
their partners with partnership (and sometimes personal) funds.
This tidy little set of relationships experienced its first cracks during the Great
Inflation. Since banks held most of the loans they made as assets, significant inflation
meant that the cost of funds soon exceeded the interest payments earned on these
assets, an asset-liability mismatch. This mismatch was especially critical for savings
banks and savings and loans because their assets, home loans, were made for quite
long periods – 25 to 30 years – at least when compared with the effective maximum
of 5 years for commercial loans. So, quite quickly, savings institutions were earning
negative returns on their assets and in the name of deregulation demanded the ability
to raise interest rates on deposits in order to staunch the exodus of such funds, often
to the newly invented money market funds, or to longer dated, and therefore higher
yielding, certificates of deposit, often brokered into large denominations by
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investment banks and brokerage firms. This relief they slowly received. They also
demanded the ability to make other, allegedly more lucrative, types of loans. This
relief they did not, at least at first, receive.
The story of commercial banking in these years is significantly different.
Commercial banks, which also experienced a significant outflow of corporate funds,
though here from non-interest bearing checking accounts, as well as a less extreme
negative return on asserts, responded to these events in ways quite different from the
savings institutions. First, they quickly moved into floating rate loans, pricing loans in
terms of the changing cost of short-term funds.

This shift had the effect of

protecting the spread between their cost of funds and the interest paid on the loans
they made and held. Second, they moved to a business model that was driven more
by fee income than by interest income. Growth in fees paid, preferably up-front, and
if not, at least recurrently, became the coin of the realm and the large fees paid to
investment bankers and brokers were a source of envy on the part of every large bank
CEO.
The social effects of the slow but continuing shrinking of the segment of the
economy that was mass manufacturing of consumer goods was not wonderful to
watch. Whole industries disappeared as production processes moved to either Asia or
to Mexico and farther south. The impact of plant closings, much less bankruptcies,
on communities, generally located in a big arc from southern Maine across New
England and through the Mid-Atlantic and then the Mid-West as far as the Mississippi
River and often across, was depressing and painful to experience. Even where some
production persisted, the human impact was astonishing.
The impact of the disappearance of the once plentiful line jobs that, in this
heavily unionized part of the country, were the economic underpinning of the hourly
(lower) middle class lifestyle of trucks, ATVs, boats and summer barbeques is well
known. For the past thirty years or so, the overhang of such jobless blue-collar
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workers has depressed wages where and when jobs were to be had. What has not
been as regularly remarked upon is the numerically smaller, but equally extreme
decimation of middle management jobs that were the economic underpinning of the
middle-middle class lifestyle of two sedans, vacation trips, sporting event tickets and
college for the kids.

Here too, wages have been stagnant for a long time.

Simultaneously, individuals in the middle-middle class, and those further up the social
ladder too, noticed that possession of a college degree had shifted from being a
guarantee of continuing middle-middle and possibly upper-middle class status, to
being the prerequisite for entrance into a professional degree program, as a
professional degree had become all but required to have a shot at upper-middle class
status.
The common response of lower- and middle-middle class families to the
disappearance of once plentiful jobs was to turn the two-career family, once seen as
the feminist legacy of the upper-middle class, into the two job family, but now
understood as modest insurance against complete economic devastation when one or
the other job disappears. Accompanying this shift has been both a decline in the civic
life of local communities and a change in the understanding of what it means to be
middle class. Once, possession of a “good” job, even though it did not come with a
lifetime guarantee of employment, at least suggested a significant measure of the
stability that is part of what it is to have a secure class position. By the mid-1980s, a
sense of economic precariousness that had not been widely experienced in America
since the Depression was added to the long-understood precariousness of health and
life. Country music captures this change in the shift from Johnny Paycheck telling his
boss “you can take this job and shove it” in 1977 to Ronnie Dunn telling a potential
employer that he “ain’t to proud to sweep the floor” nearly 35 years later.
While these significant changes in American social life were occurring, and in
contrast the European and Japanese middle classes were holding their own, three
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troubling things were happening in the world of finance. The first was known as the
Savings and Loan Crisis. It took a while for Congress to address the problems that
savings and loans were having.

When such help was finally offered the Great

Inflation was largely over. Help came in the form a plan to allow these institutions to
grow themselves out of their problems by being permitted to expand their lending
activities into commercial real estate and some types of commercial lending.
Not wholly surprisingly, the managers of existing savings and loans were not
really experienced at commercial real estate lending and even had they been, were
surprised when, in 1986, a change in tax law made many of the commercial real estate
loans they had made implausible business propositions. Much commercial property
was simply dumped onto the market, their mortgages defaulted. Losses at savings
institutions were enormous and were exacerbated by a decline in residential lending in
the late 1980s as well. These two problems, when combined with a not insignificant
amount of outright fraud and various varieties of chicanery, cupidity and stupidity,
destroyed the savings and loan industry at a cost to the Federal entities providing
deposit insurance and other support totaling about $125 billion.
The second troubling thing in finance began as the Savings and Loan Crisis
wound down. It was growth of “The New Economy,” a locution that in retrospect is
more pregnant than the silliness it was attached to. These were the early days of the
worldwide web portion of the Internet and the idea that underpinned The New
Economy buzz was that web-based businesses were going to replace bricks and
mortar stores everywhere. Venture capitalists sprang up like mushrooms after a rain.
They were looking for new “ideas,” no, not new businesses, just new ideas to fund, all
on the principle that first mover advantage would make early investors rich with a
quick IPO on the NASDQ, including a big first day “pop” in price. Accompanying
this buzz was a great rush to build the fiber optic backbone that would support the
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expected new businesses and deliver high-speed Internet service that would replace
the dial-up model that AOL had pioneered for e-mail.
The flavor of the era can be had in the documentary “Startup.com,” the
chronicle of a business that went from idea through first round funding to shutdown
in less than a year. For a while a tsunami of money chased the stock of those dotcom startups that made it to an IPO and the first day pop in price. Indeed, from 1998
through early 2000 it seemed that there was no mountain high enough. And then the
whole run-up of dot-com stocks on the NASDQ crumbled, as it turned out the first
mover advantage applied only to the few firms that were selling a product or service
that people really wanted. Not surprisingly, the valuation of the companies whose
only asset was the putative backbone, or even just the plan for building such,
crumbled as well. And one of them, WorldCom, even brought an accounting scandal
with it. While, these events cost the Federal government almost nothing beyond that
of the inevitable subsequent “investigations,” lots of people lost a lot of money
chasing chimera.
The story of the third troubling thing in finance – the so-called “Sub-Prime
Crisis” of 2007-08 – begins back at a time when most everyone was distracted by the
end of the Great Inflation and the beginnings of the Savings and Loan Crisis, though
this has only become obvious in recent years. During this earlier time two things
happened that would transform American banking. The first was almost invisible –
the development of the Collateralized Mortgage Obligation. Originally, the CMO was
nothing more than a funding option created for Freddie Mac, an organization that
usually funded its purchases of home mortgages by issuing its own debt instruments.
By securitizing pools of mortgages owned by Freddie Mac, this odd non-bank-bank (it
accepted no deposits and so technically was not a bank) could both remove mortgages
(its assets) off its books and also provide collateral to secure the resulting debt
securities. This financial maneuver effectively both allowed Freddie turn a portion of
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its direct borrowing into a working capital fund and to tap into a set of borrowers
who preferred secured investments to general obligation bonds. In due course, Fanny
Mae followed and then everyone was doing it – like rabbits. After all, there were fees
to be earned from the jobs of assembling the mortgages, creating the entities that
would hold the mortgages and selling the resultant securities. What was there to
complain about earning fee income?
When the other thing that would transform American banking initially
surfaced, it seemed to be nothing but noise. One kept hearing that American banks
were “falling behind” their European and Asian peers and so were unable to compete
effectively in the globalized financial markets. The implied referent competitors were
the British, French and especially German “universal” banks that combined
commercial banking with investment banking and broker-dealer activities (and in
some cases insurance). The primary attraction of this model, to the extent that its
attraction was not just “bigger is better,” was the fee income of the investment
bankers and broker-dealers, and of course, the possibility of profit from proprietary
investments and trading. The supposed economic selling point was to be found in the
dangerous word “synergy,” in this case the idea that all financial services could be sold
at one point by one company, a hoped-for “cross-selling.” All that was needed for
this great benefit to appear was the supposed magic of 1980s style deregulation, a
simple objective – repeal two sections of Glass-Steagall that effectively forbid such
combinations.
While the debate about Glass-Steagall repeal waxed and waned two apparently
isolated, and thus supposedly unrelated, financial problems briefly turned the public’s
imagination from the dot-com boom and bust.

The earlier problem was the

implosion of a prominent hedge fund, the inaptly named Long-Term Capital
Management. LTCM combined the talents of two soon to be Nobel laureates in
economics with those of a famous trader from Salomon Brothers, several of his

17

protégées, and a former Vice-Chair of the Federal Reserve. The Nobel Prize was for
a method of valuing derivatives, contractually defined investments whose value is
derived (hence the name) from some other financial thing, a stock, bond, currency,
interest rate, index value or the like.
Initially, LTCM specialized in trades based on the expectation that similar
financial instruments with small differences in price would converge on one price. In
order to be really profitable, these trades required borrowing enormous quantities of
money. American and some foreign banks willingly provided this leverage. Over
time, as opportunities for engaging in its initial strategy disappeared, LTCM added
significant investments in both interest-rate and currency derivatives, by definition
highly leveraged investments given that LTCM was a respected (and very profitable)
hedge fund and so had to post little, if any, capital to secure its derivative contracts.
The firm collapsed when its positions in derivatives based on Russian as well as Asian
bonds simultaneously collapsed. The New York Federal Reserve Bank was forced to
organize a rescue of LTCM that was funded by its major creditors.
Soon after LTCM collapsed came the Enron debacle. Lots of things can be
said about Enron, but the simplest are four. It was primarily a firm that that took
advantage of the deregulation of public utilities.

It entered into contractual

agreements to provide long-term sources of energy to the newly deregulated utilities,
traded the resulting contracts with others and used derivatives to hedge its obligations.
Many of its actual positions, particularly losing ones, were hidden away in specialpurpose vehicles, off-balance sheet entities, some of them quite misleading and maybe
fraudulent. These entities were part of an effort to maintain Enron’s stock price, an
effort that included a nest of dubious accounting practices designed to make the
company seem both more profitable and less indebted than it was.
In the ensuing scandal, some people were convicted and some of them went to
jail. Enron’s auditor, Arthur Anderson & Co., was likewise convicted, promptly
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collapsed and was liquidated. Though the scandal is best known for prompting the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, designed to improve financial oversight of public
companies, still, for present purposes, the most significant aspect of Enron was the
firm’s combination of off-balance sheet entities and derivatives, a combination that
brought about the Sub-Prime Crisis, the aftermath of which can still be felt.
After the repeal of the relevant sections of Glass-Steagall, major American
banks quickly established trading desks and pieced together the brokerage and
investment banking units whose fee income they had long coveted. These units also
were supposed to provide increased profits from trading gains. It was expected by all
that this combination would prove that financial services could generate steadily
growing profits and so permit large banks to separate themselves from the traditional
norms for the valuation of bank stocks, valuations that were based on models of
smaller/lesser banks. Success in this effort would pump up stock price and not
incidentally management compensation. And for a while it worked.
All of the financial mechanisms necessary for accomplishing this objective were
in place. Securitization was a proven technique for bundling assets and selling them
and special purpose vehicles were an easy mechanism for doing so without clogging
the balance sheet with assets earning low returns. Mortgage backed securities were a
perfectly sensible focus for trading strategies because the banks knew their properties
since they had created so many. Derivatives were both a good way to hedge risk and
perfect for trading since, like mortgage-backed securities, fees were earned on their
creation, and large banks were not required to post collateral to secure their
outstanding contacts. The finance academics that had spread across the land from
their home base at the University of Chicago assured everyone that, despite LTCM,
the combination of modern portfolio theory and advanced procedures for the
measurement of risk made it highly unlikely that anyone could lose a lot of money
investing in securities. Crucially, the money market funds, originated way-back during
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the Great Inflation, were quite willing to fund open positions in tradable assets
through overnight, and sometime longer, repurchase transactions. And last, but not
least, the response of the Federal Reserve to the crash of the dot-com crazed stock
market was, just as would have been expected, quickly lowering interest rates.
Mortgage rates joined the downward parade. Housing markets shifted into overdrive.
The American Dream was on the march again.
For many people that Dream had been on hold since about 1978 when the
combination of a decline in the value of the Dollar and a rise in the price of oil
effectively signaled that the Post-War Economy had come to an end. Up until this
point the growth of wages and the growth of productivity had roughly paralleled each
other. Slowly the growth of family income, commonly measured in quintiles, began
to diverge. The top quintile began to grow faster than the other four. In fifteen or so
years this divergence began to show up in patterns of consumption; a public
luxuriation of the consumer discretionary portion of retail markets was followed by a
growth in the acceptability of, as well as a public fascination with, the display of
ostentatious wealth. For those who found themselves with incomes less than might
provide ostentatious wealth, maintaining lifestyles indicative of social position
increasingly required the use of debt in the form of home equity loans, exotic varieties
of mortgages and heavy credit card borrowings for personal consumption. Thus, it
came to be the case in parts of the consumer economy that carrying large amounts of
personal debt became acceptable. The financial services behemoths gorged on the
resulting obligations.
What happened next is the stuff of legend and a whole shelf of books. Money
was made until it wasn’t and then whole edifice collapsed as first, the rise in value of
houses nationwide, but especially in hot markets, stalled, then tumbled. Next, the
value of off-balance sheet vehicles holding mortgages on homes in these hot markets,
or securities based on them, was questioned and so these assets had to be returned to
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bank balance sheets. Thereafter, asset values became equally difficult to measure and
so overnight funding became difficult to acquire. With asset values questionable and
leverage removed, fire sales were the order of the day. They drove mark-to-market
accounting of retained assets lower.

Profits vanished; losses drowned quarterly

reports; stock prices tanked. Only Federal intervention on a scale undreamed of ever
before saved the system. Meanwhile, no one seemed to care about the borrowers
whose houses had plunged in value, much less lost jobs in the accompanying general
economic slowdown.
It is a mistake to call this crisis one in sub-prime residential mortgages. There
were plenty of these mortgages that should have not been written, as well as many
that were implausibly said to be of higher quality. All of this dubious underwriting of
mortgages and mortgage backed securities was part of the search for fee income on
the part of mortgage brokers, bankers and traders. However, securitization can and
did work with lots of other things including credit card receivables, bank loans,
commercial mortgages and even pieces (tranches) of already existing securities
evidencing prior securitizations. If there had been a larger pool of such other assets
to securitize, then the crisis would have been named for such assets. But there were
no larger pools anywhere in America. Everyone had to own a home. Doing so was
part of the American Dream. So, we are stuck with this name. The only good thing
about the name is that everyone knows it. The only bad thing about the name is that
it obscures both the way that the creation of the large bank model of economic
growth through the provision of financial services has deep roots in the demise of the
Post-War Economy and the way that the memory of that economy haunts the politics
of today. It is to these two questions that I now turn, and in that order.
My gentle reader might take the occasion of this section break to scream, “If it
is just these two questions that you are going to answer, get on with it! What was the
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point of this long shaggy dog story or fish on a plank recipe?” My answer is simple. I
believe that what I have to say is significantly counter to what, in Leonard Cohen’s
words, “Everybody knows.” I doubt that, faced with a one paragraph listing of the
relevant events, any but the most gullible of readers would buy the observations I
offer in the following pages.

I don’t wish to speak to the gullible, but to the

thoughtful, if quizzical, reader, toward whom I have attempted to show respect by the
provision of enough detail to permit the fashioning of other answers, or possibly even
other questions, than the two I address below. In the language of my youth, my ideal
reader is from Missouri and stubbornly says, “You gotta show me.” So, I have first
shown and now I will try to tell.
The Post-War Economy delivered what Americans wished for – a broader and
deeper middle class. Yet, in so wishing, Americans were not careful. They did not
understand that economic change is not necessarily a permanent ratcheting up. And
so, they were anything but attentive when, in 1962, the first hint of the passing of the
Post-War Economy appeared. By then Europeans had begun borrowing at the cheap
regulated rates available in the American market and moving those dollars abroad for
investment at the higher European rates. The American response to this pesky gnat
of a problem was to propose an interest equalization tax designed to tax the buyers of
the bonds issued by European borrowers.
I doubt that many, if any, Americans understood that this bit of transatlantic
financial arbitrage was evidence of the end of the economic isolation that made the
Post-War Economy possible. I know I did not; indeed it took me until the late 1980s
to understand the latent meaning this bit of tax law arcana. But that Americans felt
this change fairly soon seems to me evidenced by the Great Inflation. Whatever it
turned out to be in the end, at the beginning, when it was a matter of guns and butter,
the point of “and butter” was to keep the promise of the Post-War Economy alive.
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And that this attempt didn’t work, that inflation galloped ever faster to the
bewilderment of the assembled multitudes, re-emphasizes that such was the point of
“and butter.” The structure that was so comfortable to us, that had allowed America
to expand the middle class both out broader and down deeper, was not supposed to
run off the rails as economic life did in the 1970s.
Then, after life comes apart, what would one expect humans to do? Try to
fashion another comfortable life, a new economy, a new persistent market structure
that fuses an understanding of economic life that seems appropriate to the place and
time with the patterns of behavior within the economic, political, and social
institutions that enact that understanding. This is what Americans tried to do during
the anything but moderate Great Moderation, against the background of a variety of
economic thought, associated with the University of Chicago, that emphasized the
need for less regulation, freer markets that could be expected to be self-correcting and
the rightness of differential economic rewards in the market for talent.
The first attempt to fashion such a structure was timid – deregulation. That
idea didn’t seem to do much to help or to harm the economy, at least until it was too
late for it to appear as a modestly coherent idea, as opposed to a loaded political
slogan. Thereafter, came the never explicit, but always implicit, idea of building an
economy around the provision of housing, that most important part of the storied,
but never coherent, American Dream.
This somewhat later attempt at establishing a different persistent market
structure with a positive program of housing expansion made a certain sense. After
all, it was the great post-war expansion of housing into the middle class suburb that
seemed to epitomize the economy of those years. And, at least in growing areas of
the South and West, it seemed to work, until it didn’t, until a lull in home construction
brought the entire savings and loan industry into ruin.

23

In retrospect, it turned out to be significant that this debacle was easily ascribed
to the actions of thieves and charlatans. If it were just bad people who caused a
financial crisis, then maybe housing was not such a bad base on which to anchor a
new economy. After all, unlike deregulation, which brought job loss, housing had the
important benefit of supporting a large number of hourly working class jobs. We
might, and did, try it again. But before we tried housing a second time there came the
dot-com craze.
It is not a trivial accident that this boom was said to be rooted in “The,” not
“A,” but The New Economy. Here was an explicit attempt to forge the answer to the
continuing disappearance of the Post-War Economy. All of economic life was going
to revolve around the Internet and its Web. The computer geeks were to inherit the
earth, a frightening idea, but still a real idea that might, and did, capture some people’s
imagination. The fact that it was completely unclear how most Americans were going
to earn a living in this economy should have caused people to worry. Luckily, the idea
had such a short half-life that it is not surprising that few people had to confront this
lack of clarity.
Almost immediately afterward, Americans slid into the idea of grounding the
economy in financial services. The quants, the math nerds, were going to inherit the
earth. That this idea got any traction after first Long-Term Capital Management and
then Enron imploded is one of the great mysteries of the past forty years. The tie of
financial services to housing, accidental as it was, and of housing to the American
Dream, probably explains part of the attraction. But still, exactly how finance would
provide jobs for the entire lower middle class was never clear beyond the ritual
repetition of the mantra “education,” a prescription for helping a portion of the
public that, while anything but dumb, still had already voted with its feet for the
proposition that butts in the seat education was not for them. Unfortunately, this
time “luckily” cannot preface the observation that the idea did not last very long.
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There is a stream of thought that suggests that starting with the savings and
loan crisis, and maybe with deregulation more generally, the point of all of these
various attempts to create a persistent market structure was to make great gobs of
money at the expense of the sea of rubes that is sometimes referred to as “My fellow
Americans.” I suppose that there is something to this idea. After all, the world has
never experienced a shortage of thieves and charlatans. Yet, there is a sameness to all
of the stories of boom and bust that can be told while still remembering that “There’s
one born every minute.”
The endless outrage about executive and trader compensation, as well as of the
compensation secured by venture capitalists, as well as managers of hedge fund and
private equity firms, not to mention the endlessly repeated laments about the shortterm horizon of investors (part of the implicit contrast that provides the grounds for
the claim to capitalist sainthood of the Sage of Omaha) is, at bottom, a complaint
about an attitude of “Get mine and get out” on the part of the already wealthy.
Contrast this attitude with that of the similarly situated Pooh-Bahs of the 1950s for
whom patience was the watchword that accompanied the accumulation of quite
significant amount of income. “Get mine and get out,” screams a lack of faith that
any persistent market structure is about to emerge. Putting off a payday today runs
the serious risk, if only in the current Pooh-Bahs’ heads, that there will be no payday
tomorrow. Greed there almost certainly may be, but fear based on the perceived
fragility of one’s economic and social position, not fear that the various economic
police will come knocking at the door, is to be found there too.
It seems to me that the recognition of the fragility of one’s economic and social
position that comes from knowing, if only implicitly, that we no longer live in a
persistent market structure that defines an economy, but instead are adrift in
economic life, explains a significant part of politics today. Consider first the small
entrepreneur. This person’s sense of economic fragility translates into a plan to build
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fast and then sell out. The ideal is to take one’s money off the table as soon as one
can get either a strategic buyer of the private equity guys to come to call. Larger,
more complicated enterprises react to this fear of the fragility of position with
relentless cost cutting. Outsource this function, cut back on that, shave wages or at
the least put off raising them as long as possible, all pass for strategic thinking and all
are heard daily across the land. The contrast between this mindset and that of the
Post-War corporate mindset of comfortable competition based on product
differentiation, coupled with the occasional night sweats over the possibility that a
competitor could develop a breakout new product, is stark. It provides a good clue to
the fact that we are nowhere near seeing a rebuilt Camelot.
For those with only human capital to play with, the situation is much the same,
though the fear, the sense of fragility, is more directly centered in potential loss of
social position. This is not surprising in a bourgeois, not an egalitarian, democracy.
To be a renter again is psychically, as well as economically frightening. Security of
social position in a stable economic structure is essential for working stiffs, of both
collar colors.
The alternatives available to human capital when economic, and thus social,
position is threatened, or only insecure, are three – earn-more and/or borrow-more
and/or spend-less. As for the earn-more alternative, the growth of the two-wageearner family speaks volumes. As for the borrow-more alternative the extraordinary
increase in debt used to support personal consumption speaks equally loud. As for
the spend-less side, I suspect that the choices are graded. Entertainment may well be
the first to go. Next, food and clothing expenditures can be cut back a little; do it
yourself, expanded a bit. Perhaps the thermostat can be set a bit lower in winter and
higher in summer. Then there is the possibility of putting off the purchase of a new
car for a few years after payments on the old one are made. However, a reduction in
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mortgage payments is not exactly plausible. If not lower mortgage payments, what
else might be reduced?
For a long time the answer of choice seems to have been governmental
expenditures, which is to say taxes. It is important to remember that the first great
pushback against taxes came in California. In 1978 Proposition 13 limited increases in
real property taxes. The Great Inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s left many
people, mostly late 1960s and early 1970s retirees in the Sunbelt, with homes that,
because of the inflation in their value, bore increasingly higher property taxes, but
whose owners had relatively fixed incomes.
In these years similar, though more limited, foul-tempered fights over school
budgets occurred in my upper-middle class neighborhood too. So, it is important to
remember that selling one’s home in order either to pay real property taxes or to find
a new house with reduced taxes is not really an option. One either ends up homeless,
a brutal variety of social class demotion, or moves to a lesser neighborhood, a less
brutal class demotion, but still painful.
When one combines the deep economic squeeze of white middle class families
with the increase in single young men without the income to marry and single women
who had learned the feminist lesson to beware of men with empty promises, the
politics of social position can get ugly. Such humans, who utter the cry that America
is no longer ours, see a growing immigrant population – legal and illegal – many of
whom have modest professional incomes, an African-American population that is no
longer at the bottom of the social pecking order and has secured a significant number
of more than middle-class jobs and an increasingly out, successful gay and lesbian
population. That those who feel that their birthright has been stolen have focused on
rabid support for tax reduction, blind fury in opposition to what they see as new and
increased taxes, and grossly partisan redistricting and voter limitation rather than on
the use of large-caliber weapons, may suggest that they are entitled to more sympathy
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than the liberal elite is used to accord them. At the least their politics should be easier
to understand, if not to condone, a position that is not equally appropriate with
respect to those who choose to hijack such anger and bewilderment for their own,
more self-centered political purposes.
Now, I suppose that at this point some of my readers, if there are any left, will
expect me to suggest exactly how to build a persistent market structure that that will
be a new economy. Others will wish that I suggest a theory that can explain exactly
what caused the American economy to come apart in the way that it did. I can offer
neither such a prescription nor such a theory. I am an historian. Historians should
not be confused with either visionaries or theoreticians and properly are chary of
making strong statements about causation. However, in my self-limited role I can and
will suggest that almost all of the current suggestions seem foolish.
Finance is not a plausible basis for an economy. Indeed, if recent events are at
all representative, finance appears to be prone to bouts of systematic self-destruction.
It is a public utility, probably best regulated as such, that moves value from one time
period to another. And its appended bits of gambling are zero-sum games; the only
profits of such go to the house. It is not a plausible rock on which to build the vast
web of social relations that is a life. Similarly, a return to mass manufacturing to
which a unionized labor force’s salary scale might be appended an implausible
objective. The decline in cost of ocean transport has simply wiped out any such a
possibility. The alternative of radically increasing the number of cubicle warriors will
require a genetic transformation in the distribution of sitzfleisch in the population that
is likely to require more than several generations to accomplish. Likewise, remedies
that rely on ever-increasing amounts of formal education, and so assume radical
changes in the human genome, will only follow from the adoption of Lamarckian
genetic theory.
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On the other hand, suggestions that government is the problem, not the
solution, are implausible. Law, for better or worse, structures markets. Taxation and
regulation, the major activities of government, may be more or less appropriate to a
time and place, but at the same time they act together with humans to create that time
and place. So, the question of what government should do is the same at any point in
time: What kind of time and place do citizens want?
The past fifty years of wild flailing on the part of the humans who experienced
the disappearance of the Post-War Economy and its replacement by nothing at all
suggests to me that what humans want is a broader and deeper middle class. Any
view of what might be a new congenial spot for happy-ever-aftering that does not
start from this objective ought to be treated with great suspicion. That is, unless, with
a sadder, but wiser Arthur at the end of Act II, we also are willing to settle for singing
“Don’t let it be forgot / That once there was a spot / For one brief shining moment
/ That was known as Camelot.”

